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Abstract. It has been argued that urban planning policies, through minimum parking requirements, and 
income tax policies induce free employer parking. We show that tax policies induce welfare losses in 
the order of 12% of parking resource costs, implying an annual deadweight loss in the order of € 5 
billion for Europe. In the US, due to the presence of minimum parking requirements, the deadweight 
loss of policy is even higher and in the order of $ 30 billion.  
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1. Introduction 
"There ain't no such thing as a free lunch" definitely applies to parking. Free parking (from 
the user's perspective) is common but has been universally argued to distort market outcomes 
(Arnott et al., 1991; Small, 1997). We aim to estimate the welfare costs of free parking 
induced by urban planning and fringe benefits taxation and show that these are huge. We 
focus on employer parking, where almost all parking is provided for free to the employee.1 In 
the US, only a few percent of the parking resource costs are paid by commuters (Small and 
Verhoef, 2007). However, also in countries where car use is less widespread, employer-paid 
parking is the norm. 
There are two policy reasons why employees do not pay for employer parking. One 
reason, applicable to the US, is that urban planning regulations by local governments impose 
minimum parking requirements on buildings (an exception is downtown San Francisco). 
These minimum parking restrictions are excessive as the number of parking spaces far 
exceeds the peak occupancy even when users are not charged (see Shoup, 1997; 2005). Given 
excess supply of parking, employers have no incentive to charge employees (the opportunity 
costs are zero). Because there is little reason to impose minimum restrictions that increase 
parking supply, these regulations induce a deadweight loss, as society consumes too many 
parking spaces (Shoup, 2005).2 Despite a large literature on parking, we are not aware of 
empirical welfare estimates of this deadweight loss. We aim to fill this gap in the literature, 
which fits in a growing literature that aims to estimate the welfare effects of urban planning 
(e.g. Glaeser et al., 2005; Cheshire and Hilber, 2008). 
                                                 
1 For employees, employer-provided parking is much more important than curb parking. For example, in the 
Netherlands, about 80% of car commuters use employer-provided parking. 
2 One exception is when on-street parking is not priced, so commuters cruise for parking spaces, which causes 
external costs (Arnott and Inci, 2006). By imposing that employers provide free parking, the external costs of 
cruising will be reduced. Since on-street pricing is straightforward to implant, it would be hard to argue that 
minimum parking restrictions can be justified. 
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The second reason is that employer parking is not taxed as a fringe benefit in kind, 
inducing employers to offer parking spaces to employees for free while simultaneously 
reducing wages (Katz and Mankiw, 1985). This is particularly relevant for European 
countries, where income and value added taxes are higher than in the US, so the implicit 
subsidy is larger. For example, in the Netherlands, the marginal labour income tax rate is 0.42 
for most car commuters, and VAT is 0.20, so, for most commuters the implicit subsidy is 54 
percent (0.42+0.20x0.58) of the resource costs.3  
A common conclusion in the economics literature is that the deadweight loss created 
by inappropriate taxing of fringe benefits is negligible (Turner, 1987), but employer-paid 
parking has been completely ignored. Employer-paid parking is a common and costly fringe 
benefit (the average annual cost is about € 750 per parking space) but is not taxed as a benefit 
in kind.4 Hence, another gap in the literature that we aim to fill is to estimate the deadweight 
loss of a shift in parking demand caused by not taxing employer-parking benefits. This study 
is therefore complementary to the large literature on car taxation and in particular gasoline 
taxation, which receives much attention in the literature (e.g. Bento et al., 2009).  
We focus on the Netherlands where minimum parking restrictions are absent. Some 
Dutch municipalities use maximum parking restrictions for new buildings at certain locations, 
but these restrictions are usually non-binding. Restrictions typically imply that the ratio of 
parking places to employees must be less than 0.83, which far exceeds the average proportion 
of employees that drive by car (0.55)(CROW, 2008), although in some locations (e.g. near 
railway stations in large cities) the maximum restrictions are lower and binding. By 
comparison, in the US, the standard ‘golden rule’ of office planning is that there must by at 
least 4 parking spaces per 1,000 square feet (Shoup, 2005, p. 608), implying that the ratio of 
                                                 
3 We ignore employer taxes on labour that are used for pensions and unemployment benefits, because these taxes 
generate future benefits. 
4 In urban areas the costs are much higher. For example, in Amsterdam, the average cost is € 1,600, whereas in 
the centre of Amsterdam it is about 3,000 Euro 
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parking places, to employees, exceeds 1.3. Because land (and parking) prices are determined 
in competitive markets, it is reasonable to assume that employers consume parking on their 
parking demand function. 
According to classical welfare economics, the welfare implications of policies that 
distort employer-provided parking markets depend on the firms' parking demand and supply 
functions. Firm demand functions reflect employee demand functions. In a competitive labour 
market without distortions, the firm and employee demand function are identical. In the 
current paper, we estimate these functions for Dutch employers, using information about the 
employers' cost of providing parking to employees. This information is rather unique as there 
is currently a lack of information of these costs (see Small and Verhoef, 2007, p. 113). We 
use information from nation-wide office property transactions (collected by real estate agents) 
where information about the number of parking spaces and parking prices is separately 
reported. In the rest of the paper, we proceed as follows. In section 2, we introduce the 
employer parking data. In section 3, we estimate the firms' parking demand and supply 
functions and provide deadweight losses of distortionary policies. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Office parking data 
Data about parking have been obtained from a publisher (PropertyNl) which receives nation-
wide commercial property transactions from real estate agents. These data refer to properties 
with a minimum size of 200 m², so small properties are excluded. The publisher sets a number 
of requirements to the information provided by real estate agents.5 Agents are obliged to 
provide information about location, type of building (e.g. office space) and property size, but 
are not obliged to provide information about prices or certain specific characteristics of the 
building, including parking. 
                                                 
5 The property is advertised (on internet) and the transaction is published (in the publisher's magazine).  
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We use observations for the years 2001-2007 that refer to rented office buildings 
(about half of property transactions belong to this group). We select office buildings, because 
for these buildings about 95% of parking demand is generated by employees (CROW, 2008). 
Hence, for office buildings, the firms' demand for parking is synonymous with the firms' 
demand for parking space used by employees. The data do not allow us to distinguish 
between offices without any parking and offices where information about the number of 
parking spaces is missing. Hence, we are constrained to work with a sample of observations 
with at least one parking space. This does not create a selection bias, because the data refer to 
large properties that almost always have some parking. 
For many offices, only a part of the advertised property is transacted (so for example, 
3,000 square meter and 30 parking spaces are advertised and only 1,000 square meter and 
then parking spaces are transacted). We have estimated separate models using advertised and 
transacted characteristics which are presented in an appendix. As the results are similar (but 
less reliable because the instruments are less strong), and average parking price for 
transactions is only 0.5% lower than for advertised properties, we pool data on transacted 
properties with advertised properties (when the transacted properties are missing).  
The resulting rather unique office dataset includes 8,935 observations. For 2,931 
observations we know the annual rent per parking lot, which we label the parking price. The 
results we present in the current paper are based on these observations. We have investigated 
whether this creates a selection bias with a two-step Heckman correction model. In the first 
step we use as instrument a dummy variable which captures whether or not there is 
information about the building’s annual rent. The idea behind this instrument is that providing 
information about the building's rent should be positively correlated with the probability of 
providing information about parking but this should not be correlated to the demand or supply 
of parking. The results with a Heckman correction (that explicit models the potential selection 
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bias) are identical to the ones without a Heckman correction. So we will only report the latter 
ones. Apparently, the reporting of the parking price is not related to the demand for parking.  
 
3. Empirical results 
Table 1 provides the descriptives of the variables in our analysis. The average price for a 
parking spot is € 758 per year, with a standard deviation of € 509 (for 95% of all observations, 
the price is between € 250 and € 2,400). 6 The average office size (excluding parking) is 1,378 
square metres (14,978 square feet).7 The average number of parking spots is 26. On average, 
firms' expenditure on parking is 8.8% of office building expenditure. 
We aim to estimate the demand for parking as a function of parking price controlling 
for office size, distance to the closest highway ramp and distance to the nearest train station. 
The dependent and explanatory variables are in logarithms. In addition, control dummies are 
added for the year of transaction. 
To identify the demand for parking, we use a 2SLS approach, using several 
specifications. In the first specification, we do not use any other controls than the 
aforementioned explanatory variables. In two other specifications, we control for 129 
municipalities, or 516 area fixed effects respectively. Controlling for municipalities is useful, 
because it controls for differences in municipality regulations regarding parking. Controlling 
for municipalities may not be sufficient, however, to control for unobserved spatial variation 
in demand or supply factors as well as for within municipality variation in policy. We, 
therefore, also use areas fixed effects defined by four digit postcodes. The areas are quite 
small: the average distance between properties belonging to the same postcode area is only 
612 metres, which makes it plausible that unobserved spatial heterogeneity is minimal. 
                                                 
6 This average price is not the average price faced by employees. To calculate the latter, we have calculated the 
average weighted price, using the number of parking spaces per firm as weights. The average weighted price is € 
754, so only € 4 lower. 
7 One employer uses on average 30-35 m2, so the average workforce of these firms is about 40 to 50 employees. 
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We instrument parking price with the construction year of the office (which is provided for 
64% of the observations, see Table 1). Construction year is a valid instrument as it affects the 
current price of parking through historical supply decisions without directly affecting 
demand,8 because it reflects land prices (and the conventional parking norm) at the time of 
construction and therefore historical building costs.9 F-tests, provided at the bottom of Table 
2, indicate that the effect of construction year on parking price is sufficiently strong to be used 
as an instrument in the demand function.  
Table 1: Descriptives       
   Mean  Std. deviation 
Parking price (€)  758,25  509.70 
Parking spaces  25.80  41.20 
Office size (square metres)  1,378  2,240 
Parking expenditure/building expenditure  0.088  0.057 
Distance to nearest highway ramp (metres)  1,858  1,577 
Distance to nearest train station (metres)  1,693  1,568 
Construction year     
Missing  0.36  0.48 
Before 1970  0.04  0.19 
1970‐1980  0.05  0.21 
1980‐1990  0.15  0.36 
1990‐2000  0.20  0.40 
After 2000  0.20  0.40 
 
The results are presented in Table 2. Our main result is that the price demand elasticity 
ranges between -0.918 and -0.612. The results in column 3 of Table 2, where we control for 
area effects, and which are likely most reliable, indicate a price demand elasticity of -0.612 
with a standard error of 0.150.10 Further, note that office size, which captures number of 
employees, has a unit demand elasticity. 
 
 
                                                 
8 See Appendix Table A2 for the results of the first steps of the 2SLS regressions. We only provide the first step 
where we use area controls. The other first steps are similar and can be received upon request. 
9 As emphasised by Arnott and Rowse (2009), it is usually prohibitively expensive to increase parking (e.g. 
under the ground) after construction. For example, buildings constructed between 1980 and 1990 (when land was 
relatively cheap) have nowadays still more parking spaces. 
10 Appendix Table A1 provides the results of separate analyses using advertised and transacted information. 
Using transactions, the demand elasticity is close to unity, whereas using advertising the point estimate is -0.435. 
The results of OLS regressions, not reported here, suggest a negative, but lower price demand elasticity (in 
absolute value). 
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Table 2: Demand for parking (in log)    
   2SLS  2SLS FE  2SLS FE 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
log(price)  ‐0.834  ‐0.918  ‐0.612 
   (0.146)  (0.186)  (0.150) 
log(office size)  0.985  0.980  0.970 
   (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.012) 
log(distance to highway)  ‐0.049  ‐0.003  ‐0.058 
   (0.015)  (0.031)  (0.032) 
log( distance to train station)  ‐0.034  ‐0.044  0.020 
   (0.029)  (0.032)  (0.033) 
year dummies  yes  yes  yes 
area fixed effects  no  no  yes 
municipality fixed effects  no  yes  yes 
no. of fixed effects    128  516 
average group size    23  5.8 
F‐test for weak instruments (construction year)  12.46  12.81  24.33 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.       
 
We have re-estimated this model to examine how sensitive the results are to 
specification. We included area fixed effects defined by six digit postcodes. The main 
advantage is that the average distance between properties belonging to the same six digit 
postcodes area is only 71 metres (and less than 200 m for 90 percent of the observations), so 
unobserved heterogeneity with respect to the economic environment can be completely 
assumed away. The main disadvantage of adding so many fixed effects is that for 734 
observations there is not another observation in the same postcode area and for the other 
2,197 observations, 814 fixed effects are included, so the degrees of freedom are strongly 
reduced. Nevertheless, it appears just possible to estimate the price demand elasticity with 
some precision: it is -0.416 with a s.e. of 0.230, so it is still statistically significant at the 10% 
level. This point estimate is not too far from the -0.612 point estimate using four digit 
postcode dummies. This gives confidence that our estimates are not driven by unobserved 
heterogeneity in local factors. Furthermore, models based on more selective samples were 
estimated (e.g. a sample without Amsterdam where parking prices are about twice the 
national average), but the results remain robust. 
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The second part of the empirical analysis entails identifying the firm's parking supply 
function. Let us suppose that the supply function is horizontal, so there are no economies of 
scale in constructing parking spaces at the level of the firm. Given this assumption, any valid 
instrument (hence, any variable which shifts the demand function, but which does not shift the 
supply function) will be statistically weak, because a horizontal supply curve implies, by 
definition, that the equilibrium price is constant. In other words, the effect of the instrument 
on the price (in the first step) is absent (despite a large shift in the demand function). Office 
size has an extremely strong effect on parking demand (the office size elasticity of demand is 
unity, with a t-value of 60). However, when we use this variable as an instrument in the first 
step of the instrumental variable analysis, we do not find any effect on parking price, 
implying that the firm's parking supply curve is (almost) horizontal (see last column of Table 
A2 in the Appendix: the coefficient of log(size) is 0.010 with a standard error of 0.007). This 
makes sense, at least for larger properties analysed here. 
 
4 Welfare implications 
The price elasticities allow us to examine the welfare effects of policy distortions. We assume 
that the estimated elasticities are invariable with the distortive policy examined and that issues 
regarding congestion and pricing of on-street parking are of second order. We also assume 
that the labour market is competitive. Given a horizontal supply function and a log-linear 
demand function with price elasticity β, the deadweight loss per firm equals 
1
1 1 0 1 1 0 0( ) (1 ) ( )q p p p q p q     for β ≠ -1, where p and q represent the parking price and 
number of parking places respectively. The subscript 0 denotes the market outcome given a 
non-distortionary policy, whereas the subscript 1 denotes the outcome given a distortionary 
policy. Our welfare analysis will be based on the average parking price in our data, and relies 
on the assumption that the price paid by firms reflects the resource costs of parking. Because 
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some (but not all) municipalities use maximum restrictions for certain locations, it may be the 
case that due to restrictive supply the average price is somewhat above the average resource 
costs. However, given strong competition of office buildings between different municipalities 
(office vacancy rates are 5 to 15% in most areas), this is likely a minor issue. 
 
4.1 Distortionary taxation of parking fringe benefits 
Employees who obtain a parking place from their employer do not pay any income tax (or 
VAT) on this fringe benefit, which shifts the firms' parking demand curve to the right (as 
employers will substitute parking for wages). The deadweight loss is calculated using market 
averages. In line with information provided in the introduction, we assume now that the 
effective parking price faced by employers is exactly 50% of the resource cost. Average 
employer parking cost is about € 750 (see Table 1), so p0 = 750 and p1 = 375. Further, 
according to this table, the average number of parking spaces q1 equals 26. Using a demand 
elasticity of -0.612, this implies that q0 = 17. Hence, the policy not to tax parking as a fringe 
benefit increases the number of parking spaces by about one third.11 The annual deadweight 
loss is then € 2,250, about € 90 per parking spot. So, on average about 12% of Dutch 
employer parking expenses are a deadweight loss. In the Netherlands, there are about 3 
million employer-provided parking spaces (Van Dijken, 2002), so the annual welfare loss is 
about € 270 million. For Europe as a whole, assuming that the welfare loss per parking space 
(and the ratio of employer parking spaces and employees) is the same as in the Netherlands, 
the implied annual welfare loss is in the order of € 5 billion. Any other welfare losses of these 
policies due to increased energy use, pollution, congestion and reduced agglomeration are 
excluded here (Parry and Small, 2005), although these additional losses may be small in the 
Netherlands where present fuel taxes already partially capture these externalities. 
                                                 
11 Such an estimate seems reasonable as it must be interpreted as a long-run estimate. The short-run demand for 
parking is quite elastic when user-charges are introduced for employees (Shoup, 2005), but the long-run estimate 
which allows for employee sorting based on workplace and residence is likely much higher. 
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4.2 Minimum parking restrictions 
We consider now a hypothetical policy that imposes minimum restrictions, such as prevalent 
in the US, which effectively reduces the price of parking to zero. This policy creates an excess 
supply to levels where the parking demand function is likely discontinuous. For example, the 
firm's inverse parking demand function drops to zero when the number of parking spaces 
exceeds the number of employees. To avoid discontinuities, we consider a policy that 
increases supply by 30% above current (already distorted by benefits taxation) levels. Shoup 
(2005) provides evidence that minimum restrictions at US offices are usually 30% above peak demand 
when users are not charged. Given a demand elasticity of -0.612, an exogenous increase of 30% 
in supply (from 26 to 34) due to minimum restrictions reduces the parking price from € 375 to 
€ 241, so by 32 percent. Given p0 = 750, q0 = 17, p1 = 241 and q1 = 34, the annual deadweight 
loss per firm is € 5,916, about € 227 per parking spot, so about 30% of the parking expenses 
are a deadweight loss.12 US employer parking expenses are estimated to be about $ 100 
billion per year, so the implied deadweight loss is estimated to be in the order of $ 30 billion 
per year. This excludes the additional welfare losses because of increased externalities which 
have been argued to be substantial in the US. Our point estimates will not exactly hold for the 
US, because the spatial structure of the US is not comparable to the Netherlands (which 
resembles Los Angeles in size and spatial structure). Nevertheless, the implication that current 
US urban planning policies are extremely distorting is likely to hold.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In a series of papers, Shoup has argued that US urban planning through minimum parking 
requirements, as well as distortionary tax policies regarding free parking benefits, lead to 
                                                 
12 Hence, in the Netherlands, conditional on current tax practices, the introduction of minimum parking 
restrictions would induce an annual deadweight loss of around € 137 per parking space (€ 227- € 90) about 18% 
of parking expenses. 
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large welfare losses (e.g. Shoup, 1997; Shoup, 2005). Our empirical research supports this 
conclusion. Minimum parking requirements and tax policies in the US are estimated to induce 
a deadweight loss of about 30% of resource parking cost, so about 30 billion per year. This 
excludes other welfare losses of these policies due to increased energy use, pollution, 
congestion and reduced agglomeration. For Europe, the welfare loss is estimated to be about 
12% of the resource parking costs, approximately € 5 billion per year. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Demand for parking (in log)                
 Transactions  Advertised 
   2SLS  2SLSFE  2SLSFE  2SLS  2SLSFE  2SLSFE 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
log(price)  ‐0.676  ‐1.372  ‐0.969  ‐0.875  ‐1.036  ‐0.435 
   (0.197)  (0.277)  (0.187)  (0.151)  (0.221)  (0.146) 
log(office size)  0.996  0.997  1.001  0.998  0.984  0.946 
   (0.016  (0.020)  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.013) 
log(distance to highway)  ‐0.044  0.076  0.074  ‐0.009  0.039  0.015 
   (0.020)  (0.044)  (0.034)  (0.018)  (0.034)  (0.025) 
log( distance to train station)  0.010  ‐0.104  ‐0.108  ‐0.040  ‐0.074  ‐0.028 
   (0.035)  (0.045)  (0.037)  (0.026)  (0.036)  (0.024) 
year dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
area fixed effects  no  no  yes  no  no  yes 
municipality fixed effects  no  yes  yes  no  yes  yes 
number of observations  1,719  1,719  1,719  2,423  2,423  2,423 
number of fixed effects    100  414    121  469 
average group size    17.2  4.2    20  5.2 
F‐test for weak instruments (construction year)  4.99  6.18  11.49  12.20  9.24  24.66 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A2. First steps in 2SLS: dependent variable: log(price) 
  
   Transacted  Advertised   Pooled  
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
log(office size)  ‐0.000  0.024  0.010 
   (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
log(distance to highway)  0.067  0.072  0.072 
   (0.022)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
log(distance to train station)  ‐0.137  ‐0.087  ‐0.096 
   (0.019)  (0.013)  0.012 
Instruments (construction year)       
built 1970 – 1980  ‐0.004  ‐0.061  ‐0.023 
   (0.068)  (0.049)  (0.045) 
built 1980 – 1990  ‐0.141  ‐0.120  ‐0.144 
   (0.062)  (0.042)  (0.040) 
built 1990 – 2000  ‐0.049  ‐0.029  ‐0.044 
   (0.061)  (0.042)  (0.039) 
built 2000 – 2007  0.141  0.175  0.143 
   (0.062)  (0.043)  (0.040) 
building year missing  0.015  0.036  0.006 
   (0.058)  (0.040)  (0.037) 
year dummies  yes  yes  yes 
area fixed effects  yes  yes  yes 
municipality fixed effects  yes  yes  yes 
number of observations  1,719  2,423  2,961 
number of fixed effects  414  469  516 
average group size  4.2  5.2  5.7 
 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
